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In the first year of the conflict, the Foreign Office was keen to promote and extend, "as a matter of 
patriotism", a retaliatory campaign against companies and individuals who acted in opposition to national 
interest in neutral countries. Indeed, the enhancement of that policy was strongly held by merchant 
communities, who saw an opportunity to take an advantage of their identity as Britons abroad. This aspect 
allows to explore broadly not only the challenges issued to the "war of words" waged in neutral merchant 
states but also to see, in a new light, the warfare in peripheral theatres. We propose, then, an approach to one of 
the most compromising points for the running of the British propaganda machine during the First World War: 
national ambitions and moves towards neutrals. 
 
British Winning Strategies and War Aims 
In spite of latest remarkable contributions, the neutrality still remains an understudied topic by comparison 
to those related to belligerent societies, which have traditionally been the focus of the international scholarship 
from diverse military, political, economic, social and cultural views. Thus, a hundred years later, the diversity 
of “neutrals and neutralities” in the First World War strikingly continues to offer, in many ways, an open field 
to do research and put into perspective. Particularly the study of the propaganda is fruitful to test, within the 
scope of war schemes and targets, the expectations of warring sides about neutral states. Marc Frey’s works 
already gave the primary emphasis on the importance gained by the northern neutrals (Holland and 
Scandinavian countries) to the belligerent war economies and eventual plans for peace. German Mitteleuropa 




 However, both sides were not on equal terms to fight on that vital ground. Due to her overwhelming 
merchant fleet and financial resources, Great Britain took the lead of the economic warfare in the autumn of 
1914. Even in such an early stage, neutrals became not as much an essential source for military supplies and 
rear consumption as an integral part of the strategy for a potentially "Greater Britain". From then on, the 
postwar configuration, if we put the controversy of the "short-war illusion" to one side, was crucial to British 
statecraft and decision makers' mentalities. In such a view, the economics had a deep impact on initial queries 
relative to neutral press. Incidentally, it would challenge the alleged British intentions of entering the war to 
safeguard the integrity of neutral and small nations.  
On those bases, in the following introductory pages, we will briefly put the propaganda outline in the 
context of three issues converging at the British national appeal launched in August 1914: naval hegemony, 
commercial retaliation and their effects on neutral rights discourse. These three main points were against the 
backdrop of the arguments to legitimize the mobilization of the British community, depending always on either 
neutral or belligerent interests at play.  
 
So, these are necessary preliminaries to deal with: 
 
1. The prewar planning in the Committee of Imperial Defense (CID) and the concept of warfare 
consequently entailed upon since 1904. Clearly then, the discussions showed the antagonism between 
departments which would eventually have been engaged in war as well as inner dissensions of their own, 
particularly within the Admiralty. A prime significant example was the dilemma over how to tackle naval 
coercion against Germany. There were two main positions on whether naval constraints should merely be 
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restricted to a close-coastal blockade or not. Against the conventional blockade policy the more aggressive 
idea of warfare arose, within the scope of what has been called "Fisher naval revolution" or unlimited use of 
economic retaliation. In other words, sea trade routes should be tampered with preventing all neutral 
commerce from Germany. That proactive policy was based on the belief that Britain's opponents, being aware 
of their weaker battle fleets, would primarily target British trade. According to Lambert's works, maximalist 
economic warfare was "no longer a component of naval strategy but rather had become the foundation of 
national grand strategy".
95
 Nonetheless, Lambert's interpretations have been discussed by other naval 
historians.
96
 The terms of this scholarly debate exceed our concrete research purpose. But what appears more 
appealing here is the inclusion of the neutral issue in prewar high-level planning. In 1912, the formation of the 
so-called "Committee Desart" demonstrated that the neutral concern essentially had to do with discussions on 
"Trade with the Enemy" and retaliatory measures in wartime. In this sense, attention should be drawn to the 
updated sights put forward by naval history which, borrowing recent Seligmann's words, has evolved from "an 
old-fashioned, largely technical and thoroughly unimaginative narrative-based sub-genre" into a renewed field 
offering "new interpretations of historical events with a maritime dimension".
97
 British propaganda activities 
during the First World War were definitely affected by both maritime and economic dimensions. 
2. Foreign Office guidelines on an issue as sensitive as neutral rights, in conjunction with British merchant 
lobbies in neutral markets in 1914-1915. The neutral issue was a controversial cornerstone of the alleged 
"British Grand Strategy" well until into 1916. Overall, the more self-motivated civilian mobilization did not 
only make a difference to Home Front and Front Line, it also affected another front: the "Neutral Front".
98
 The 
early mobilization of British merchant residents in neutral countries, fuelled by a deep feeling of national 
community under siege, was embodied to a great extent in the Chambers of Commerce created after the start 
of the conflict and, in an advanced stage, in the Federation of British Industries. Commercial organizations 
intended to run propaganda quite independently of home needs. Their initiatives would dispute the consistency 
of the London political discourse.
99
 For instance, Dehne has depicted this reality in South America.
100
 Britons 
would have been let down by home authorities' negligent attitude towards German business circles in Brazil, 
Argentina or Uruguay.
101
  At that moment, the Foreign Office official position was that Great Britain could 
under any circumstances afford to undermine their claim that she had entered war in defense of neutral 




Paradoxically from Hoffmann's thesis, re-elaborated later in imperialist terms by Kennedy and his 
followers in the 80s, the idea of economics was put through the definite “realities behind diplomacy” resulting 
in the conflict.
103
 However, the supposed British decline in 1914 has been argued to a greater or lesser degree 
by scholars. From an iconoclastic view, Ferguson for instance challenged the idea that the history of Europe 
between 1870 and 1914 might be seen as a history of Anglo-German rivalry.
104
 Contrarily, the city financial 
strength as true muscle of international trade, the hegemony over naval merchant routs, shipping and freight 
insurances, coal victualling or cable communications, made Great Britain have a clear advantage over her 
rivals. So the flaws in the old-fashioned model of relationship between economics and international policy 
demand further knowledge on the role of the Foreign Office, either it restrained  from most aggressive plans 
towards neutrals or it challenged the orthodox "business as usual" prevalence.
105
 Likewise, political claims on 
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"tardy trading with the enemy” legislation might be confronted with the different domestic lobbies seeking to 
influence legislators on that particular issue.
106
  
Nevertheless, in the present state of research, there are works that already address attention to the existing 
balance of power between British residents in neutral countries and the politicians and bureaucrats at home. 
They especially deal with peripheral contexts under British political and economic hegemony, such as South 
American nations, Spain or Portugal.
107
 On those particular backgrounds, the running of the supposed Grand 
National war strategy might be put to the test, just to establish its quality, performance and shared aims 




3. Neutrals in the Grand National strategy. Actually, this is the point that brings up the main issues to be 
dealt with in the following pages. What did that supposed national strategy consist in neutrals? What about 
their incentives? What were the overlaps and major obstacles for the propaganda achievements on that field? 
To dig into these themes, we should start with the way in which frames of mind about German harassment 
were initially shaped. The necessity of articulating unfolded aggressive self-defense policies turns to be in the 
focus, in combination with the extent in which new standards proved to be adaptable to each neutral context.  
To that aim, attention will be paid to three significant stages: (1.) the previous months to the war, from 
February to June 1914; (2) the very beginning of the conflict, October 1914; and, finally, to assess propaganda 
handicaps (3) between July 1917 and March 1918.  
 
Waging "War of Words": Is it All about Business? 
 
 "MERCHANT PESSIMISMS" FORGES NATIONALTHREATS 
In September 1914 a compilation of the "Dispatches from his Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin respecting an 
official German organization for influencing the press of other countries" was presented to both houses of 
British Parliament. It was a collection of confidential reports issued between February and June 1914 by the 
former ambassador at Berlin, William E. Goshen, dealing with an alleged German project for a powerful secret 
association, so-called "Association for World-Commerce", to the aim of promoting industrial prestige and the 
spread of political influence.
109
 By then, the cabinet was to clarify the steps to be made to fight German 
propaganda. At the same time, the Neutral Press Committee was created under the Home Office sphere.
110
  
But, paradoxically, the pre-war German plans appeared to be not so much an aggressive proposal as a 
defensive one. Their promoters declared that they intended to fight the "dark forces" operating by means of 
hostile propaganda against German progress in world markets. So, their "Association for World-Commerce" 
was to remedy that "evil with persistent pro-German propaganda in the countries most being complained 
of".
111
 Funding for the project was to be provided by a particular group of companies, while their technical 
agents would be responsible for advising entrepreneurs in foreign markets. Particularly, Goshen pointed to the 
launch of the German American Economic Society, the German Argentine Association and the German 
Canadian Society. 
 Nonetheless, despite the secrecy in which the bidding was conducted, the design of the strategy caused 
great controversy. Internal dissensions soon appeared between the Central Association of German Industrials 
and its main rival, the Federation of Industrials, to the point that by March 1914 several important members 
had resigned their seats.
112
 Late in spring, it was claimed that lines of work, regarding the German reputation 
abroad, had "been transferred to another more delicate and more or less secret organization".
113
  So, British 
concerns were raised about not only the official encouragement "commanding enormous revenue for the 
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purposes of a pro-German newspaper propaganda" but also the under covered nature of that budding 
organization. In other words, propaganda was then linked with the incoming process of intelligence-gathering 
activities in the dawn of the foundation of the secret services. Commercial intelligence was indeed the starting 
point of a subterranean "war of words".  
From February 1914 onwards, some meetings would have been held by the head of the Press Bureau of the 
German Foreign Office, Dr. Hamann, with members of leading holdings in attendance, namely the North 
German Lloyd, the Hamburg-America Company, the Deutsche Bank, Siemens, Krupp...etc.
114
 Eventually, that 
secret organization would also have entered into agreement with the Agence Havas, which in future would 
only publish German news coming from Wolff Telegraphen Bureau. Besides, Wolff would receive that news 
exclusively from the propaganda organization to be founded. Similar arrangements would be intended with 
Reuter wherever it kept the primacy as a news agency.
115
  
However, that British confidential information might be brought into question. Reports might be 
considered less accurate than had intended to be presented in September 1914.  Although the Deutsche Export 
Review had published in June further stuff on a syndicate for supplying news and spread “the knowledge of the 
true state of German industry and of Germany's cultural achievements", it was also remarked that the syndicate 
used the organization already in existence.
116
 Moreover, those dispatches informed of an alleged private 
company with such a "conveniently vague purpose" as promoting the German industrial prestige. It seems that 
there was as much of conjecture in German formulations as in British perceptions of them:
117
   
 
Whether the evil exist or not -the money will be spent on secret service to popularize Germany abroad. It does not 
seem to have occurred to the promoters of the scheme that they are preparing the ground for a vast system of 
international blackmail- hardly a proper way to reach the desire end.  
 
But apart whether accurate or not was thinking on an inimical blackmail system, what appears more 
interesting are the countries where the alleged system was to be implemented in. These were chiefly the South 
American states and those of the Far East, where Great Britain, once the war broke out, first left behind the 
"business as usual" by approval of trading with the enemy exceptional laws covering British monopolist 
practices.
118
 In those peripheral and quasi colonial theatres, the conflict had no sooner flared up than 
international law and neutral rights blurred. So in the end, British counter-measures sought to be modeled on 




On the eve of the First World War, growing merchant insecurities, whether being unfounded or not, were 
thus reversely reflected in the German and the British. How would this affect propaganda course?  
THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 
In the autumn of 1914 the propaganda system, despite being started without any clear conception, was in 
operation in neutral countries. At this initial stage, our object is to measure the position being occupied by the 
commercial issue in procedures. The memorandum by Max Müller on leading neutral countries press, 
addressed in October to the Foreign Office, can enable us to follow some useful examples. 
Consistently with British pre-war naval and economic planning, Scandinavian and northern European 
neutrals, bordering on the enemy, were soon spotlighted. Closed attention was firstly paid to Sweden because 
of the apparently pro-German bulk of opinion, in particular in the conservative and military sides. Despite the 
intensity of German campaigns and the "natural" hostile feeling aroused with the inclusion of iron ore in the 
British contraband list, Müller's document stressed on the counteracting measure that a bilateral commercial 
agreement might offer (what indeed would not be as easy as thought then). Strikingly, it was also suggested 
that in business questions, Swedes were neutral.
120
 In that sense, Müller put across some views regarding 
Swedish position, mainly coming from an electric firm in Norway. More examples of Scandinavian press 
claims on neutrality were given (most of them indirectly through correspondents in Sweden).  
Generally, neutrality was perceived as a political state of military and economic dependency on 
belligerents, which would limit the freedom of neutral speech and press. The Danish example was very clear.  
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Although the public opinion in Denmark would definitely be anti-German, the strong commercial connections 
between the two countries “would restrain the Danes from any two uncompromising expression of their 
feelings in this respect".
121
 However, exceptions were made. The Norwegian "spirit of independence" would 
not hesitate to express conveniently its opinions freely and favorably for the Allies, raising objections "to be 
spoon-fed with readymade opinions either from one side or the other" and particularly by Wolff Bureau and 
Björnson agencies.
122
 But the Morgenbladet had also published a leading article against the press campaign 
being conducted from both sides to wage their particular "war about the war". Moreover, it was pointed out 
how the Norwegian Journal of Commerce and Navigation of the 29th September had taken “a strong exception 
to the action of the British Government in declaring iron ore contraband of war".
123
 Concerning Holland, as in 
other neutral countries, the newspapers would have been "deluged with German papers, pamphlets, and 
circular letters" while "there was a great feeling of irritation at the measures taken by Great Britain to check 
any trade through Holland with Germany".
124
 German propaganda was taking advantage of British restrictions 
on neutral trade. That was also the case in the United States where commercial and maritime blockade matters 
caused main political controversies.  Later, it would be suggested that propaganda work should be closely in 
touch with the Ministry of Blockade. 
Regarding British retaliatory measures, Swiss arguments were singled out by Müller. Some newspapers 
stressed on the inconvenience of expressing  anti-British feeling because of the negative effects on the export 
trade of Switzerland after the war, “as it must not be forgotten that the British Empire provided one of the best 
markets” for Swiss production.
125
 The Swiss economy was indeed very dependent on the British naval 
restraints in the Mediterranean. Since August 1914, the Gibraltar flotilla stopped and examined almost all ships 
which left America bound for Italy and Switzerland, monitoring and putting pressure on the Portuguese and 
Spanish international transit trade.
126
  
Moreover, the campaigns promoted by German consulates and the Deutsche Lloyd Company in Italy were 
noticed.
127
 In October 28th the British Consul at Venetia put German attacks down on paper. He asked 
"whether any steps had been taken to combat the German methods" at the same time he pointed out that it was 
foreign to British nature to imitate German course of action.
128
 Precisely, British merchant views on Italian 
public opinion were a distinguished source of political information.   
So at the beginning of the "war about the war" in neutral countries, the commercial issue became quite 
noticeable while political and economic arguments were mixed together, having an effect on British self-
representations of being a neutral defender. The Danish press, for instance, discussed rumors about British 
Government’s plans to violate their neutrality, remarking the contradictions of those alleged plans coming 
from a nation “that has actually gone to war to protect the neutrality of another small country".
129
 All in all, 
interferences in domestic affairs of neutrals tended to imply violating international law, as it was very apparent 
in British actions towards sea trade. In spite of evidences, the memorandum concluded expressing in positive 
terms and evading most controversial aspects derived from commercial and maritime interferences affecting 
neutrals. But, unfortunately for the British propaganda scheme, it would not be possible to evade those aspects 
for ever. 
 THE THORN OF DOUBLE STANDARDS (1917-1918) 
In July 1917 the work on neutral press was considered to be unsatisfactory. Several reports pointed to the 
neglect of the special psychology and prejudices of the countries to which the propaganda was being sent.
130
 A 
carefully inspection of what had been done until then hardly revealed any such accurate propaganda. The 
extracts used to be "constructed on somewhat mechanical lines". Once again, attention would be paid to 
commercial affairs in every country. The Department of Information, hosted by the Foreign Office, made a 
plea for a "business section". Although some breakthroughs came from Sweden, much of the stuff appeared "to 
have no distinctive aim or value".
131
 The same was said about Holland and Spain, where propaganda had 
shown a lack of "intimate knowledge" of domestic affairs. According to the information provided in the 
memorandum, many complaints had arrived from Spain about half-measures and conflicting actions. So, 
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broadly speaking, the propaganda scheme inside neutrals was not going entirely to plan even in the last months 
of the war. 
In March 1918, a wide range of severe structural weaknesses were highlighted; notwithstanding, two key 
issues were the scant British share in foreign publishing markets and the neutral ignorance of the British 
political system and values.
132
 At that time, it was intended to give more facilities to special correspondents to 
bear testimony to the British "ideals of political liberty and justice". But, overall, commercial propaganda 
remained a noticeable issue. It should clearly be improved in countries like Switzerland, where propaganda 
had mainly been confined to the subsidizing of the Swiss Export Review, "largely instrumental in giving 
[Britons] a hold over the "Zürcher Post".
133
 Moreover, in regard to advertising, keeping British "peace aims to 
the fore and take into account after war commercial enterprise" was considered a requirement for all 
operations, "by whatever means".
134
  
But paradoxically, British enterprise had vigorously been engaged in propaganda aims since the onset of 
war. The point was the inconsistency between the expressed attitudes and the actual behavior through 
dominant positions in neutral markets. Particularly, the use of the dreaded blacklist entailed important revenues 
but also disadvantages for the national sake.  
The blacklist was a register of natural and legal persons, with whom nationals were prohibited by their 
government from contractual union. The extension of British blacklisting affecting neutral companies offered 
powerful political counterarguments in the propaganda field, so the issue became a thorn in advertising the 
British cause 1917 onwards. The British followed a double standard policy. Supposedly, they were pursuing in 
neutral countries the same monopolist policies they denounced in the Germans. War turned into a stage to do 
more business than usual, capturing markets at the expense of non-inimical interests.  
This was for example a case for the legitimacy of the Allied cause in Spain, where it was common to hear 
talk of the British “blacklist business”.
 135
 But German agents found a particularly fertile field to win over 
public opinion in South America, especially in Argentina where the veto system might have worked harshly. 
Dehne showed how British Chambers of Commerce played there a key role with a "more constructive form of 
participation in the war effort" promoting an aggressive "anti German" commercial policy.
136
 The Foreign 




But the intended patriotic policy against the enemy trade did not always run for the benefit of the British 




The gravest mistake in policy has been the introduction and method of operating the Black List in Argentina. The 
Policy of our Government at this time should surely be one of expediency and I say emphatically that the operation 
of the black list in the Argentine attacks the sovereignty of that people, alienates the commercial community, 
damages British prestige and British commercial interests, and has failed entirely in its avowed objects -to cripple 
and kill German trade. 
 
On those terms, the Black List would have failed to erode German commercial houses because of the use of 
"cloaks". While vetoes were damaging neutral pro-British companies "to almost an exaggerated point", pro-
German interests went easily ahead. This was the case of the company Salaberry and Bertheche. As long as 
Salaberry was the Argentinean Minister of Finance, it would be impossible to put the firm on the Black List.
139
  





of a such nature which would lead one to believe that one was living in a country under the jurisdiction of England 
instead of being a neutral country under an independent Government.  
 
Deep concern was specially raised on how vetoes ruined British prestige while "best friends which England 
has ever possessed out there" were being lost. Moreover, Argentines in high positions would be losing their 
sympathy for England “on account of their utter disgust of [British] methods" and their inconsistencies.
141
 It 
was argued that no amount of propaganda might wipe out the damage. 
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 In the end, a radical revision of merchant policy was unsuccessfully recommended. The author of the 
report probably was observing not only a state of things in common to neutral countries; also he was upholding 
some local and partisan interests considered to be adversely (or rather unfairly) affected by the application of 
blacklisting.  
However, the point here is to highlight the extent in which British policies applied to neutrals were difficult 
to reconcile with the chosen rhetoric of respect for neutral rights. The influence of some lobbies in the Foreign 
Office, in conjunction with commercial engagement "from bellow", turned war into a stage to do more 
business than usual capturing neutral markets (and not only at the expense of the enemy). That questionable 
way of thinking brought undesirable effects for the propaganda work. All in all, it would not be easy to correct 
some miscalculations or flaws in the British mobilization in neutrals due to the primacy of the partisan views 
on trade rivalry. The national trenches of commercial warfare were dug, under misconceived incentives, before 
the real war had broken out. Commercial warfare might primarily be considered a state of mind crashing into 
the enemy one.  
So the "war of words" or the "war about the war" was no such a simple task as it was thought in 1914. 
There was also a neutral counterpart willing to send a feedback. So, in this aspect as in many others, the Great 
War represented a great testing ground for all belligerent and neutral strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
